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EvidenceCorner | Hearsay and Exceptions

“Santa Baby, just slip a sable
under the tree for me ”
1

Or at least a catchall exception to the hearsay rule?
By Cynthia Ford

(a) In General. Under the following
circumstances, a hearsay statement is not excluded
by the rule against hearsay even if the statement is
not specifically covered by a hearsay exception in
Rule 803 or 804:

In previous columns, I have covered the non-hearsay
definitions in 801(d). In my Evidence class at UM, I go on from
there to look at the specific hearsay exceptions in 803 and 804,
discussing the requirements and underlying policy for each. I
(1) the statement has equivalent
postpone discussion of the “residual” or “catchall” exceptions
circumstantial guarantees of
until the very end of our hearsay study, because I am afraid that
trustworthiness;
once the students learn about those, they will not see any point
(2) it is offered as evidence of a material fact;
in focusing on the articulated specific exceptions. I should (and
do) confess here that I began this column as a big skeptic of the
(3) it is more probative on the point for
residual exceptions.
which it is offered than any other
However, as we are in the holiday season, I decided to
evidence that the proponent can obtain
devote this article to what seems like an enormous gift if you
through reasonable efforts; and
are struggling to escape from a hearsay objection: the residual
(4) admitting it will best serve the purposes
exceptions to the hearsay rule. Are they a Black Friday door
of these rules and the interests of justice.
buster? (A related matter of philosophy: Is it ever worth getting
(807(b) requires “reasonable notice” of the intent to use this
up to go shop in the middle of the night?) Could Santa load
provision, so the opponent has a “fair opportunity” to meet it.)
Rudolph’s sleigh with residual exceptions and still fit down the
The 1997 Advisory Committee Note to F.R.E. 807 states:
chimney? Should you bother with a specific exception when
there is a catchall? In the process of considering these lifeThe contents of Rule 803(24) and Rule 804(b)
changing questions, a miracle happened: I was converted and
(5) have been combined and transferred to a new
now believe the residual exceptions are in fact real, not just a
Rule 807. This was done to facilitate additions
lump of coal in the evidence stocking. Otherwise, why would
to Rules 803 and 804. No change in meaning is
they be included in the rules? And isn’t an extra way around the
intended.
hearsay rule as good as a ’54 Convertible, or “decorations from
When Montana adopted the M.R.E., we generally modeled
Tiffany’s”?
them on the F.R.E., and chose to add this catchall to conform
to the F.R.E. The Montana Commission Comment to M.R.E.
FEDERAL AND MONTANA
803(24) notes:

RESIDUAL HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS

Both Montana and the federal systems have a safety valve to
allow admission of some hearsay even if it does not fit within
the specific exceptions. Both systems used to show this by
having “residual” exceptions as part of Rules 803 and 804. In
1997, the federal rule makers removed the residual components
of Rules 803 and 804, and combined them into new F.R.E. 807,
which now reads:
1 Eartha Kitt, “Santa Baby.”
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There is no equivalent Montana law to this
exception. The adoption of this exception changes
existing Montana law to the extent that it allows
a court to admit hearsay because an equivalent
guarantee of trustworthiness exists even though
there is no specific exception allowing it.
Montana still retains the two separate versions of the
residual exception: M.R.E. 803(24) and 804(b)(5). Rule 803
provides exceptions to the hearsay rule for certain categories of
HEARSAY, next page
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hearsay, even if the out-of-court declarant is available to testify:
Rule 803. Hearsay exceptions: availability of
declarant immaterial.
The following are not excluded by the hearsay
rule, even though the declarant is available as a
witness: …
(24) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically
covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but
having comparable circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness.
Rule 804 provides additional exceptions but only if the
declarant is unavailable under 804(a). It ends with 804(b)(5):
Rule 804. Hearsay exceptions: declarant
unavailable. …
(b) Hearsay exceptions. The following are not
excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is
unavailable as a witness: …
(5) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically
covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but
having comparable circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness.
The Montana residual clauses are simpler and less restrictive
than the current federal corollary, omitting any need for prior
notice. The Montana version is identical to the federal version
which was submitted by the federal Advisory Committee;
the difference lies in the additions made to the federal rule by
Congress. The Montana Evidence Commission Comment to
803(24) intentionally rejected the Congressional amendment
and kept the original federal language:
The Commission believed this exception should
allow “room for growth and development of the
law of evidence in the area of hearsay” (Advisory
Committee’s Note, supra 56 F.R.D. at 320)
and that the amendments by Congress are too
restrictive and contrary to the purpose of the
provision. These amendments can be criticized
as follows: the requirement that the statement
be offered as evidence of a “material” fact is
redundant in requiring relevance as defined
in Rule 401 and uses outmoded language so
indicated in the Commission Comments to that
rule. The requirement that the evidence be more
probative on the point for which it is offered
restricts the use of these types of exceptions
by imposing a requirement similar to that of
unavailability under Rule 804; this restriction
would have the effect of severely limiting the
instances in which the exception would be used
and be impractical in the sense that a party would
www.montanabar.org

generally offer the strongest evidence available
regardless of the existence of this requirement.
The requirement that the general purposes of
these rules and interests of justice will be served
is unnecessarily repetitive in view of Rule 102.
Finally, the notice requirement is unnecessary
because of discovery procedures and the
discretion of the court in allowing advance rulings
on the admissibility of evidence.
The Montana Commission Comment to 804(b)(5)
indicates that the same considerations apply to that version
of the residual rule as to 803(24) and that “the Commission
Comments to that Rule applies [sic] here.”
The Montana Supreme Court has described the difference
between the two rules as:
Rule 804(b)(5), M.R.Evid., provides an exception
to the hearsay rule for statements not specifically
covered by any of the exceptions enumerated
in 804(b)(1) through 804(b)(4), but having
“comparable circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness”. Rule 804(b)(5) has been
characterized as a “catchall exception” to the
hearsay rule. However, it is distinguished from
Rule 803(24), M.R.Evid., where the availability of
the declarant to testify is immaterial, in that Rule
804(b)(5) comes into play when the declarant is
unavailable to testify…
State v. Mayes, 251 Mont. 358, 364, 825 P.2d 1196,
1200 (1992).
My review of the cases indicates, though, that the Court uses
the same loose analysis in deciding cases under both rules. If
your declarant is available to testify, you should proceed under
803(24) alone, but if your declarant is unavailable, try both
803(24 and 804(b)(5).

RECENT MONTANA CASES
My personal view of the residual exceptions was that when
you have to use them to surmount a hearsay exception, you
are on the ropes and unlikely to succeed. I vastly prefer to
use one or more of the specific exceptions or the non-hearsay
definitions than to launch upon a vague “circumstantial
guarantee of trustworthiness” quest. The Montana Supreme
Court also has several times indicated that the residual
exceptions are an extraordinary tool:
the residual exception “should be used sparingly,
and only in exceptional circumstances,” …
Hocevar, ¶ 50 (citing State v. Brown, 231 Mont.
334, 338, 752 P.2d 204, 207 (1988).
Larchick v. Diocese of Great Falls-Billings, 2009
MT 175, 350 Mont. 538, 547-48, 208 P.3d 836,
845.
However, it turned out that I am too squeamish, and
HEARSAY, next page
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“sparingly” is not the same as “never.” Montana lawyers
have presented residual exception arguments to the Supreme
Court since 2000 in 9 cases under 803(24) and 8 cases under
804(b)(5)2. (There is some overlap where both were used in a
particular case). I discuss some of these below, as illustrative of
the Court’s approach to these catchalls. Because the Court has
treated hearsay by child declarants as a separate category, I do
the same.
In In re Estate of Harmon, 360 Mont. 150, 253 P.3d 821,
2011 MT 84, the proponents of a holographic will made before
the testator executed her written formal will filed affidavits
opposing summary judgment for the named heir. The affiants
recounted various statements that the testator had allegedly
made about being “hoodwinked” into signing the formal will
and about her desire to stick with the handwritten version. The
Supreme Court observed:
In sum, the affidavits contain purported
statements of the decedent, Cecilia, to show her
intent to give property to Waitt and to allow
Knudson to purchase his rental home at discount,
and about Harmon’s allegedly heavy-handed and
self-interested treatment of Cecilia….
Thus, the Court found, the statements were hearsay and
the affidavits inadmissible unless some hearsay exception
applied. The appellant advanced several specific exceptions
and both of the catchall exceptions (803(24) and 804(b)(5))
for admissibility; the Supreme Court rejected all of them and
found the trial judge did not abuse her discretion in granting
summary judgment for the heir.
¶ 37 Finally, Waitt claims the statements are
admissible under M.R. Evid. 804(b)(5). This rule
is a “catch-all” provision when the declarant is
unavailable, and allows admission of a statement
that has “comparable circumstantial guarantees
of trustworthiness” to the four enumerated
exceptions in Rule 804(b): former testimony,
statements made under belief of impending
death, statements against interest, and statements
of personal or family history. There are no such
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness
associated with the statements in the affidavits
submitted by Waitt. Given the often highly
contentious nature of estate distribution, the
opposite is true. Montana law has historically
been hostile to the admissibility of out-of-court
statements made by the testator regarding his
or her testamentary intentions when a valid will
exists and the testator’s mental capacity is not at
issue. In re Colbert’s Est., 31 Mont. at 472–73, 78
P. at 974–75 (quoting Throckmorton v. Holt, 180
2 These counts are from a WestlawNext search using the rule numbers as the
search term. Several of the cases, though, when read, merely indicated that a
residual exception had been cited by the lawyer, but was not considered by the
Court because another specific exception applied.
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U.S. 552, 573–74, 21 S.Ct. 474, 482–83, 45 L.Ed.
663 (1901)). The District Court did not abuse its
discretion in concluding that Rule 804(b)(5) was
inapplicable.
253 P.3d at 830.
The Court was briefer but equally clear in rejecting 803(24),
the other “catch-all,” as an alternative basis for admission.
Jordan Larchik was a freshman at Billings Central High
School when he suffered a permanent eye injury during a P.E.
class on lacrosse. The case went to a jury trial, where the P.E.
teacher, Hardenbrook, testified that he was present in the
gymnasium during the class. Several defense experts rendered
opinions based on this fact. The jury rendered a verdict for the
defense.
About six weeks after the trial ended, plaintiff’s counsel Liz
Halvorsen received a phone call. The caller identified himself
as a friend” of the P.E. teacher, and said that Hardenbrook
had asked him to call to tell Ms. Halvorsen that he had been
pressured to, and did, lie about his presence in the gym at the
time of the accident. Ms. Halvorsen immediately notified the
trial judge of this call, and subsequently moved for a new trial
based on newly discovered evidence. In support of her motion,
the plaintiff submitted an affidavit from Ms. Halvorsen as well
as phone company records substantiating that a call had been
placed from a cell phone belonging to teacher Hardenbrook to
Ms. Halvorsen’s phone.
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the lower court
abused its discretion when it denied the new trial, and
remanded the case for a new trial. It specifically held that Ms.
Halvorsen’s affidavit was admissible even though it contained
hearsay, under 803(24):
¶ 31 Furthermore, despite the Diocese’s argument
to the contrary, the District Court did not err
in determining that Halverson’s affidavit was
admissible even though it contained hearsay.
Under the residual exception to the general
prohibition on hearsay, a statement is admissible
even though it is not specifically covered by the
other exceptions on hearsay if it has “comparable
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.”
M.R. Evid. 803(24). This exception “looks to the
circumstances surrounding a hearsay statement
when it is made—the circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness that lend reliability to the hearsay
statement in lieu of cross-examination.” State v.
Hocevar, 2000 MT 157, ¶ 50, 300 Mont. 167, 7
P.3d 329. (Internal quotations omitted.) While
the residual exception “should be used sparingly,
and only in exceptional circumstances,” we
conclude that Halverson’s affidavit was admissible
as a trustworthy statement of an officer of Court
under M.R. Evid. 803(24). Hocevar, ¶ 50 (citing
State v. Brown, 231 Mont. 334, 338, 752 P.2d 204,
207 (1988). Significantly, the Diocese does not
necessarily dispute Halverson’s description of
HEARSAY, next page
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the phone call from “Mr. Peterson” or the phone
record which indicates that the call was placed
from Hardenbrook’s cell phone. (Emphasis
added)
Larchick v. Diocese of Great Falls-Billings, 2009
MT 175, 350 Mont. 538, 547-48, 208 P.3d 836,
845.
In In Re J.J.L., 355 Mont. 23, 223 P.3d 921 (2010), a public
defender for a father facing termination of his parental rights
failed to object to hearsay statements of the children and their
mother made to a detective and two counselors. (Neither
the children nor the mother testified themselves). The trial
court apparently was concerned about the use of this hearsay
in his decision, and asked the parties to brief its admissibility.
The State filed a brief; the father’s attorney did not, and thus
the judge deemed an admission by the father that the State’s
position was well taken. The judge ruled that the hearsay
statements were admissible under the residual hearsay
exception in Rule 803(24). Based on these statements, the
children were adjudicated Youths in Need of Care. Although
the Supreme Court did not directly discuss the merits of the
application of the residual exception, it did hold that the failure
to object to the hearsay and the failure to file a brief on the issue
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. 3
The defendant in State v. Hocevar, 300 Mont. 167, 7 P.3d
329, 2000 MT 157 was the mother of Wesley, who was four
years old when he was taken to the hospital for an overdose
of Benadryl. The treating physician, who was aware of the
prior deaths of two other children, reported her suspicion of
Munchausen-by-proxy syndrome. Wesley recovered, but Susan
was convicted of criminal endangerment. (The jury could not
reach a verdict on the other crimes charged). On appeal, she
argued that she should have been allowed to introduce at trial
the videotape of Wesley’s interviews, which occurred five and
twelve days after the overdose. When the prosecution objected
on hearsay grounds, the defense cited three hearsay exceptions
in 803: 803(1),“present sense impression;” 803(5) “recorded
recollection;” and the residual exception in 803(24)4. The
Supreme Court rejected both specified exceptions, and also held
that the trial court was correct in refusing to apply the residual
exception:
The residual exception “look[s] to the
circumstances surrounding a hearsay statement
when it is made-the ‘circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness’ that lend reliability to the hearsay
3 A 2013 case also discussed failure to object to clear hearsay (again, reports of
sexual assault by a child to a trusted adult) as ineffective assistance of counsel.
The majority held that it did not, citing possible strategic considerations for not
objecting. Justice McKinnon wrote a strong dissent, joined by Justice Cotter. Neither opinion actually considered whether either of the residual exceptions would
apply. See, State v. Aker, 371 Mont. 491, 310 P.3d 506, 2013 MT 253.
4 Wesley did not appear to testify at trial, although there was no specific finding
or argument that he was unavailable. If he in fact was, the defense technically
could have also cited the other residual exception, 804(b)(5), but it seems they did
not, and it is not at all likely to have changed the ruling at trial or on appeal.
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statement in lieu of cross-examination.” State v.
J.C.E. (1988), 235 Mont. 264, 272, 767 P.2d 309,
314. “Everything that bears on the credibility of
the speaker and the accuracy of his statement
counts....” Christopher B. Mueller and Laird C.
Kirkpatrick, Evidence § 8.65 (1995). We have
held that the residual exceptions “should be used
sparingly, and only in exceptional circumstances.”
State v. Brown (1988), 231 Mont. 334, 338, 752
P.2d 204, 207.
State v. Hocevar, 2000 MT 157, 300 Mont. 167,
183, 7 P.3d 329, 341.
The Court recited the trial judge’s findings about the
reliability of the interviews, which he apparently viewed in
making his decision, and summarily concluded: “The admission
of the videotaped interviews was properly denied under the
residual exception because the videotapes did not manifest
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.” 300 Mont. at
184.
The Supreme Court affirmed the opposite ruling in the
same year, obviously on different facts. In Estate of Silver, the
opponents were the decedent’s son and the decedent’s estate,
which was trying to reclaim approximately $200,000 in cash
which the son claimed his father gave him. The son, Jack, had
visited his 86 year-old father, Morris, on the eve of surgery,
and they agreed both that it would be necessary for the father
to have at-home caregivers after he was released, and that
the large amount of cash the father kept in his house should
be moved somewhere safer. The son and the father’s friend/
employee arranged for a safe deposit box at a bank, and brought
the paperwork home for the father to sign. The box was in the
name of the father, but the son was also to be “a signer allowed
access,” according to the father’s written instructions to the
bank. The banker had checked the “joint tenant” box on the
lease form. A few days before the father died, the son visited
the safe deposit box and removed the cash in it, putting it into a
separate safe deposit box which was in the son’s name only.
The son moved for summary judgment, which the estate
opposed. When the trial judge granted summary judgment for
the estate, requiring the son to return the money, he appealed
and alleged error in the judge’s admission of the hearsay
statements of the father (who was obviously unavailable under
804(a)) under the residual exception. The Supreme Court
affirmed both the evidentiary ruling and the final judgment:
¶ 18 Over Jack’s objection, the District Court
allowed testimony by Kathleen St. John and
Carolyn Sauro regarding statements Morris made
to them concerning the money in the safe deposit
box. Kathleen stated by affidavit that when Morris
agreed to put the money in the safe deposit box,
he asserted that it was still his. She stated that she
never heard him say he intended to make a gift of
the money to Jack or that he did not consider it to
be his money. Carolyn stated in her affidavit that
Morris was most emphatic that the contents of
HEARSAY, next page
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the safe deposit box were to remain his. She also
attested that at no time did Morris indicate he had
made any gift to Jack of the contents of the safe
deposit box and once during the summer of 1997
he said he may have to go to the safe deposit box
to secure some of his cash.
In re Estate of Silver, 2000 MT 127, 299 Mont. 506,
509, 1 P.3d 358, 360.
The Court found that the admission of the affidavits fell
within the residual exception of 803(24):
¶ 21 Similarly, [to two earlier cases discussed
at length] in the present case, the contested
testimony is evidence of Morris›s stated intent to
retain ownership of the cash which he had placed
in the safe deposit box. Rule 803(24), M.R.Evid.,
provides that statements not covered by the
enumerated exceptions to the hearsay rule will be
allowed if comparable circumstantial guarantees
of trustworthiness exist. Here, the statements put
into context Morris›s opening of the safe deposit
box and the placement of the cash within the box.
We hold that the District Court did not abuse
its discretion in admitting the testimony about
Morris›s statements of intent concerning the
money which he arranged to have placed in the
safe deposit box
2000 MT 127, 299 Mont. at 510-11, 1 P.3d at 361.5
Silver was cited by the appellant in Estate of Harmon,
discussed above, but held inapplicable.

CHILD HEARSAY
The Montana Supreme Court has faced several difficult
cases involving child witnesses. The unique nature of these
cases led it to carve a subset of “residual” hearsay requirements
to determine the admissibility of statements made by the child
declarant to an adult who then testifies to prove the matter
asserted by the child. The legislature stepped in to codify a
special exception to the hearsay rule for criminal cases, but
some questions remain undecided about the interpretation and
application of that statute, and it does not apply to civil cases.
State v. S.T.M., 317 Mont. 159, 75 P.3d 1257, 2003 MT 221,
involved a charge of incest by the defendant with his toddler
daughter. Both sides agreed that the girl was incompetent (she
5 Justice Trieweiler dissented on the holding that the statements by Morris in
the affidavits were hearsay at all; if they were, he disagreed with their admission.
However, he took the view that the statements were not offered for the truth of
the matter they asserted, but “were offered, instead, to prove that Morris actually made the statement, and, therefore, depended solely on the credibility of
Kathleen St. John and Caroline Sauro.” In my Evidence class, we call this “offered
not to prove the truth of the matter asserted, but to prove the state of mind of the
speaker.” If this is the reason they were offered, then the out of court statements
by Morris do not meet the definition of hearsay under 801(c), and are not barred
by 802, so there would be no need to deal with the residual (or any) exception.
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was only 35 months old, and described as “shy”), and thus
“unavailable” per 804(a), to testify at trial. The trial judge held
that the daughter’s out-of-court statements to her mother and a
social worker were admissible under 804(b)(5). On appeal, the
Supreme Court applied an abuse of discretion standard:
¶ 14 …Where a court is determining
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, we
will defer to the court’s decision unless an abuse
of discretion is clearly shown. J.C.E., 235 Mont. at
275, 767 P.2d at 316 (citing State v. LaPier (1984),
208 Mont. 106, 676 P.2d 210).
The Court then reviewed its prior law on the use of 804(b)
(5) for evidence from young victims of sexual abuse:
The exception permits the admission of outof-court statements, which would otherwise
be excluded as hearsay, if the statements have
“comparable circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness” to the enumerated exceptions to
the hearsay rule.
¶ 18 In J.C.E., we established a framework to
guide district courts in determinations about the
admissibility of hearsay testimony from young
child victims in sexual assault cases. Before
hearsay testimony can be considered under Rule
804(b)(5), we held the district court must make
the following preliminary findings:
1. The victim must be unavailable to testify,
whether through incompetency, illness, or
some other like reason (e.g., trauma induced
by the courtroom setting);
2. The proffered hearsay must be evidence of
a material fact, and must be more probative
than any other evidence available through
reasonable means; and
3. The party intending to offer the hearsay
testimony must give advance notice of that
intention. J.C.E., 235 Mont. at 273, 767 P.2d
at 315.
The Supreme Court quoted at length from the
trial judge’s careful finding and conclusions
on these factors6, and stated “¶ 22 Were we to
decide this case solely on the basis of the hearsay
challenge, we might simply affirm here, and end
our analysis.”
In fact, the Court went on, saying “However, S.T.M. also
challenged the admission of the child’s statements in light of his
Sixth Amendment right to confront his accusers. As explained
below, we will no longer consider these two challenges
independently.” The Supreme Court ultimately held that a
HEARSAY, next page
6 The defendant had raised a Confrontation Clause objection in addition to his
hearsay objection at trial, but the trial judge virtually ignored it in his ruling. The
Supreme Court devoted much of its opinion to the constitutional element, but
ultimately affirmed admission of the statements over both objections.
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fourth factor which J.C.E. had established, (and which I omitted
from the list in the quotation above) existence of corroborating
evidence, is no longer to be considered in deciding conjoined
Confrontation/804(b)(5) cases.
The Court then assessed the young daughter’s hearsay
statements without considering whether they were
corroborated. It concluded that the circumstantial guarantees
of trustworthiness inherent in the statement sufficed to
withstand both the hearsay and Confrontation Clause
objections:
¶ 39 Upon considering the totality of the
circumstances surrounding K.M.’s hearsay
statements, exclusive of the corroborating
evidence, we conclude that her statements were
supported by the particularized guarantees
of trustworthiness necessary to withstand a
Confrontation Clause challenge. In fact, her
statements satisfied a number of the factors upon
which state and federal courts have historically
relied for indicia of reliability. See ¶ 31. Most
notably, K.M. made the initial statement to her
mother spontaneously. Her statement referenced
oral-genital contact, a matter not normally within
the contemplation of a toddler under three years
old. Further, K.M.’s mother was reluctant to
participate in the prosecution of her husband,
which makes her a particularly reliable witness to
relate the hearsay statement. Moreover, neither
she nor K.M. had any reason to fabricate the story.
State v. S.T.M., 2003 MT 221, 317 Mont. 159, 171,
75 P.3d 1257, 1264.
The Court acknowledged more difficulty with the girl’s
statement to the social worker, which was videotaped and
played to the jury, but ultimately held that it, too, was
admissible.
S.T.M. was decided before the U.S. Supreme Court rewrote
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence in Crawford v. Washington
in 2004. The Montana Supreme Court acknowledged this in
2007:
¶ 33 We note further that the District Court
did not discuss the “corroborating evidence”
factors in light of our holding in State v. S.T.M.
that corroborating evidence could no longer be
considered in assessing a hearsay statement’s
reliability. 2003 MT 221, ¶ 34, 317 Mont. 159, ¶
34, 75 P.3d 1257, ¶ 34. We decided S.T.M. prior
to Crawford and our holding was based on the
Supreme Court’s decision in Idaho v. Wright,
497 U.S. 805, 110 S.Ct. 3139, 111 L.Ed.2d 638
(1990). We removed the corroborating evidence
factor because we could not “conceive of a case in
which the admission of the hearsay statements of
an alleged victim of child sexual abuse would not
implicate the Confrontation Clause as well as the
www.montanabar.org

rule against hearsay.” S.T.M., ¶ 34. The Supreme
Court’s rulings in Crawford and Davis recently
have clarified that the Confrontation Clause only
applies to testimonial statements; thus, it is now
entirely conceivable that a hearsay statement that
fails to implicate the Confrontation Clause may
nevertheless be inadmissible hearsay. Davis, 547
U.S. at ––––, 126 S.Ct. at 2274–75. However, the
“corroborating evidence” factor does not affect
the case before us; the District Court’s lack of
“corroborating evidence” analysis could only
advantage Spencer because the District Court did
not consider as evidence S.S.’s and R.S.’s physical
HEARSAY, next page
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injuries discovered by Dr. Gerrity. Thus, we leave
for another day an analysis of S.T.M.’s continued
vitality. In light of Crawford, however, we note
that courts must again consider Confrontation
Clause and hearsay challenges independently,
contrary to our announcement in S.T.M., ¶ 22.
State v. Spencer, 2007 MT 245, 339 Mont. 227,
237, 169 P.3d 384, 392-93.
Even earlier, in State v. Osborne, the state was able to
introduce the hearsay statements of a 33-month-old child
sexual abuse victim made to a sheriff’s deputy and a social
worker, over the defendant’s hearsay exception.
¶ 20 There was no evidence, other than the
hearsay evidence, implicating Osborne. Therefore
it was evidence of a material fact, more probative
than any other evidence available through
reasonable means. However, the material fact that
the State sought to prove through the hearsay
evidence was not simply the identity of the rapist,
it was that Cassie identified Osborne as the rapist.
The fact that she may have identified Heen to
the deputy and the social worker is evidence of
a different fact, and does not constitute more
probative evidence of the same material fact.
Accordingly, we conclude that the hearsay
evidence of Cassie’s statements to Heen and Jamie
addressed a material fact and was more probative
than any other evidence available through
reasonable means. We further conclude that the
District Court made adequate preliminary inquiry
before it admitted the hearsay statements.
State v. Osborne, 1999 MT 149, 295 Mont. 54, 59,
982 P.2d 1045, 1047.
Abuse and neglect cases also involve children who have
the primary personal knowledge of their treatment, but may
be reluctant or unable to testify at trial. The trial witnesses
usually are adults to whom the children have spoken out of
court. Although the Confrontation Clause is not implicated,
the statements are still hearsay and frequently prompt “residual
exception” responses to hearsay objections.
In Re O.A.W., 335 Mont. 304, 153 P.3d 6, 2007 MT 13, was
decided the same year as the Spencer case cited above. Because
O.A.W. was an abuse and neglect, not a criminal, case, M.C.A.
46-16-220 (see below) did not apply. The prosecution moved
in limine for an order allowing hearsay testimony about the
children’s statements to be admitted at the adjudicatory hearing
at which they were found to be youths in need of care:
At the hearing, after argument on the matter,
the court ruled from the bench that the children
were unavailable to testify and that videotaped
interviews made by law enforcement officer
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Lewis Barnett, social worker Shelly Verwolf, and
Dr. Cindy Miller, a clinical psychologist, were
admissible under M.R. Evid. 804(b)(5).
In re O.A.W., 2007 MT 13, 335 Mont. 304, 306,
153 P.3d 6, 9.
Later, the state petitioned for permanent termination of
parental rights and, after another hearing, the Court granted
the petition. The parents both appealed, arguing, inter alia, that
the Court erred in allowing witnesses to present the children’s
out of court statements under 804(b)(5). The Supreme Court
affirmed both the finding that the trauma to the children
from testifying in court against their parents7 made them
“unavailable” and the holding that the hearsay was trustworthy
enough for 804(b)(5) to apply at the adjudicatory hearing:
¶ 35 The court further found that the statements of the
children were trustworthy, pursuant to M.R. Evid. 804(b)(5)
and its “residual exception,”:
And having viewed the tapes, I believe that the
two interviews in question, in particular, were
well-documented and would give the trier of fact
in this case the ability to assess the contents of
what they’re saying for accuracy without the need
for cross-examination, and I don’t do that lightly,
but I think weighing all those factors, I think the
truth here could be discerned without subjecting
these children to cross-examination or the trauma
of facing their parents in court. So I’ll find that
the children are unavailable as witnesses for this
hearing.
¶ 36 The District Court›s finding on this issue was
supported by the testimony of Dr. Ruggiero and
Dr. Miller. This finding was not arbitrary and was
made with conscientious judgment. …
335 Mont. at 311, 153 P.3d at 12.
(The Supreme Court also affirmed admission of the
children’s hearsay through their treating therapist at the final
termination hearing, although that appeared to be under 803(4)
and 703 rather than the residual exception.)

STATUTORY TREATMENT
OF CHILD VICTIM HEARSAY
In 2003, the Montana legislature enacted M.C.A. 46-16-220,
entitled “Child Hearsay Exception—Criminal Proceedings.” It
basically incorporates the criteria announced by the Supreme
Court in the S.T.M. case, discussed above. This statute creates
an additional hearsay exception for out-of-court statements
by child8 (under 15) victims or witnesses in sexual assault
HEARSAY, next page
7 There was considerable expert testimony on this point.
8 The statute defines “child” as “a person under 15 years of age.” It does not
specify whether the relevant age is that at the time of the crime, the time of the
statement, or the time of trial. I expect that this ambiguity will come up, and be
resolved judicially, in short order, because of the flood of cases implicating this
kind of evidence.
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and abuse cases: “Otherwise inadmissible hearsay may be
admissible in evidence in a criminal proceeding, if…” (One of
the requirements is that the child victim be unavailable at trial,
so if this exception were reflected in the Rules of Evidence, it
should be part of 804 rather than 803.) Although S.T.M. found
that the existence of corroborating evidence was not to be used
in deciding the admissibility of child victim hearsay statements,
this factor is included in the statute. Further, the statute
contains two procedural requirements: the proponent must give
detailed notice of intent to introduce the evidence and the judge
must file written findings and conclusions on the admissibility
of the child’s testimony.
State v. Spencer, supra, is the only reported case to discuss
M.C.A. 46-16-220 at length. There, the trial judge issued a
12-page order admitting the hearsay statements offered by
the State with the requisite notice. On appeal, among other
things, defendant argued that the trial judge violated the statute
by failing to delineate portions of his decision “Findings of
Fact” and “Conclusions of Law.” The Supreme Court held
that the trial judge “adequately complied” with the statute and
affirmed the admission of the victim’s statements through
her foster mother and a counselor. 9 (It also found that the
statements were “non-testimonial” under Crawford so that the
Confrontation Clause objection did not bar admission either).
The statute is ambiguous as to the time at which the
declarant’s age is to be measured. Perhaps more importantly, it
does not indicate whether it supplants the residual exceptions
for child-victim hearsay. Before the statute, Montana cases
had resorted to the residual exceptions for this special form
of hearsay. The unresolved question is whether a party who
wants to introduce a child-victim’s statements through an adult
witness must meet the requirements of M.C.A. 46-16-220, or
if the proponent is still free to argue for admission also under
803(24) and/or 804(b)(5).
The only pronouncement on this subject is a single sentence
in Spencer:

the residual hearsay exceptions, nor did the Supreme Court
directly address the question. Thus, an advocate might consider
invoking all three bases for admission of the hearsay statements
of child witnesses in criminal cases. In civil cases, the statute
does not apply, so the residual exceptions are still the only law
at play.

NUMERICAL ANALYSIS
As I read through the significant cases, I kept a running tally
of the rulings of the trial judges on residual exception claims
and the results on appeal. Under 803(24), I considered five
cases. In two, the trial judges admitted the hearsay and in two,
the trial judges refused the hearsay. The Supreme Court upheld
all four rulings, finding no error. Under 804(b)(5), three cases
admitted the hearsay and one refused it. Again, the Supreme
Court found no error in any of the rulings.

CONCLUSION

State v. Spencer, 2007 MT 245, 339 Mont. 227,
234, 169 P.3d 384, 390.

Montana has two rule-based “catchall” or “residual” hearsay
exceptions, and a statutory exception which applies only to
child declarants in criminal cases. The purpose of the residual
exceptions is to make “room for growth and development of the
law of evidence in the area of hearsay.10”
Although Montana cases express the general policy that
these exceptions are to be used sparingly, cases do affirm this
route to admissibility when the enumerated hearsay exceptions
do not apply.
Accordingly, I recommend that proponents of hearsay
evidence first try to fit their hearsay into one or more of the
specific exceptions of 803 and 804. (I am a big believer in
skinning the cat in as many ways as possible). If the outcome
is doubtful, deploy the wild card residual exception(s): if your
declarant is available to testify, you should proceed under
803(24) alone, but if your declarant is unavailable, try both
803(24 and 804(b)(5). In either case, be prepared to identify
the circumstances about the declarant, the witness, the subject
matter, and the statement which constitute “circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness” comparable to those in the
rest of the rule (803, 804, or both) which contains the residual
exception(s). If you are able to convince the trial court to use
this safety valve, chances are the Supreme Court will affirm.11
As we say at my house, “Santa only comes to those who
believe in him.” If you believe in the residual exceptions, they
might come true for you and your client. Better than a fur coat?

However, it does not appear that the State in that case
actually presented the issue of the continued applicability of

Cynthia Ford is a professor at the University of Montana School of Law
where she teaches Civil Procedure, Evidence, Family Law, and Remedies.

9 Obviously, it is better for the judge to actually label the portions of her written order on the admissibility of evidence under this statute as “Findings of Fact”
and “Conclusions of Law” to avoid the technical challenge that the court failed to
comply with the statute. Lawyers presenting proposed orders to judges should be
sure to do so.

10 Montana Commission Comment to 803(24), citing the federal Advisory Committee Note and rejecting the more restrictive federal provisions.
11 Better not use Eartha Kitt’s argument: “Think of all the fun I’ve missed/Think
of all the ’fellas that I haven’t kissed/ Next year I could be just as good/ If you’ll
check off my Christmas list [or at least allow the hearsay].”

Section 46–16–220, MCA, sets forth the
requirements for admitting child hearsay in
Montana criminal proceedings.
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